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Abstract Much legislation dealing with the uses of genetic information could be
criticised for exceptionalising genetic information over other types of information
personal to the individual. This paper contends that genetic exceptionalism clouds
the issues, and precludes any real debate about the appropriate uses of genetic
information. An alternative to “genetically exceptionalist” legislation is to “legislate
for fairness”. This paper explores the “legislating for fairness” approach, and
concludes that it demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of both how
legislation is drafted, and how it is interpreted. The uncomfortable conclusion is
this: policy-makers and legislators must tackle head-on the difficult policy questions
concerning what should and should not be done with genetic information. Only by
confronting this crucial issue will they achieve a workable legislative solution to the
problems caused by genetic information.
Keywords Genetic information . Genetic exceptionalism . Insurance . Legislation .
Law . Ethics
Introduction
Deciding on the appropriate uses of predictive genetic information is proving to be a
significant challenge for those responsible for legislating in this area. There is little
disagreement about the value of knowing about genetic predispositions for the
purposes of medicine and healthcare—for example, knowing that you have the
BRCA gene, indicating a predisposition to breast cancer, means that you can benefit
from risk-reducing surgery and closer monitoring of your health. However, there is
much less agreement about whether an insurance company should have access to
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that information. Ashcroft (2007) and Holm (2007) outline the difficult issues which
arise. On one hand, insurers argue that knowing this type of information means that
premiums can be set more accurately than would be possible if that information was
not available (Smith and Raithatha 2006). It is also conceivable that insurers would
“reward” risk-reducing behaviour by a decrease in premiums (Davey 2000). Having
access to this information allows the insurance industry to remain flexible, and to
ensure that insurers are not caught out by large claims which have not been paid for
through the premiums. If insurers are caught out too many times, they argue that the
industry will collapse (Meyer 1993).
On the other side is the argument that this treatment is unfair to those with genetic
risks. It is unfair to deny them access to something as important as life insurance on
the basis of a genetic predisposition, over which they have no control (Moultrie and
Thomas 1997). As well as this being bad for the individual who may have no
financial protection, this could also have a significant impact on their family
members whose risks are also affected by this information. It is one thing to increase
insurance premiums because of the results of the applicant’s genetic test. It is another
thing entirely to increase the applicant’s premiums on the basis of the results of their
family’s genetic tests. There is an assumption that familial genetic test results are
relevant to the individual applicant, however, it is not clear that this will always be
the case. Further, even if we can show that they are relevant, it does not necessarily
follow that it is appropriate to use them as the basis of an insurance decision.1
Furthermore, even if it was considered to be appropriate to use predictive genetic test
information, there is huge variation in the implications of having a genetic
predisposition. In some cases, the gene is of such high penetrance, that having the
predisposition is tantamount to a certainty. It is almost guaranteed that the condition
will eventuate. The majority of genetic predispositions do not attract this degree of
certainty, and only show that an individual has a slightly elevated risk of suffering
from the condition in question (Macdonald 2004). It is far from clear that there is a
good understanding of what this risk means, and therefore, far from clear that this
type of risk should be considered in insurance decisions. On a more general level,
this sets a precedent for stratifying society on the basis of genetic make-up. We have
seen from history how negative it was to divide society on grounds of race, and it is
difficult to see how it is justifiable to do something similar with genetic make-up.
Given these polar opposite views, it should be apparent why legislators and policy-
makers are finding it challenging to decide how our predictive genetic information
should be used.
The difficulties associated with these decisions are brought into sharp relief by
insurance. The problem in the insurance context is that the arguments are very finely
balanced. If we accept that the actuarial process is the most appropriate basis for
insurance then it is difficult to argue that insurers should ignore relevant information
such as predictive genetic test results. But, the actuarial process could lead to
significant numbers of people being refused life insurance cover directly, or
1 It might be argued that race or ethnicity is relevant to the decision whether to offer life insurance, and
that therefore insurers should be able to make decisions on the basis of race. However, in the UK for
example, this is prohibited by the Race Relations Act 1976. A state may decide that relevant
characteristics cannot be used in insurance decisions.
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indirectly as a result of very high premiums. Inability to access insurance can be
associated with other forms of significant financial exclusion, particularly difficulties
with obtaining a mortgage or repaying a mortgage once obtained. Further,
individuals and families might be forced to rely on savings in the absence of
insurance, which leaves them vulnerable to financial crisis (Mitton 2008). We can
also argue that it is unfair for reasons to do with social justice to exclude people from
life insurance cover on the basis of something, such as genetic make-up, over which
they have no control.
A number of states have attempted to offer a solution to this issue. In the UK, the
insurance industry and the government have agreed a temporary voluntary
moratorium on the use of predictive genetic test results for insurance purposes. The
moratorium is renewed every 3–5 years, and is due to expire in 2014. In Belgium,
there is legislation which prohibits the use of genetic information for insurance
purposes. Similar prohibitions of the use of genetic information for insurance purposes
were included in the Irish Disability Discrimination Act 2005. Recently, the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act 2008 came into force in the US. This Act prohibits
the use of genetic information in employment and health insurance decisions. All the
Acts take a similar approach. At the core is a definition of genetic information which
the prohibitions are constructed around. If the information in question meets the
standard laid down in the definition then it will be prohibited to use it in particular
ways. Violating the law leads to some remedy being awarded to the sufferer.
There is no doubt that it was difficult for the relevant policy-makers and
legislators to choose the most appropriate way to deal with the problems caused by
the use of genetic information. It is a controversial issue, about which are there are
many differing views. However, the wisdom of all of these approaches can be
criticised on the basis that they exceptionalise genetic information. This is
potentially very damaging to society in that it may legitimise the stratification of
society along genetic lines. There is a real question about why this genetically
exceptionalist legislative approach has been chosen. In this paper, I explore what
genetic exceptionalism is. I then go on to look at the approaches chosen in the UK
and the US, and discuss the problems arising from the genetic exceptionalist stance.
Finally, I argue that, notwithstanding the problems caused by genetic exceptionalism,
the alternative suggestion of “legislating for fairness” is unworkable and incoherent.
For this reason, legislators must tackle head-on the question of how our predictive
genetic information should be used.
What is genetic exceptionalism?
“Genetic exceptionalism” is the notion that there is something special about genetics
which makes it legitimate to treat genetic information differently to other types of
information for the purposes of regulation. Invariably, differently means better.
Whatever it is that makes genetic information special, can justify a much higher
level of legislative or political protection than would be available for non-genetic
information. The question then, is what is special about genetic information?
There are a number of different approaches taken to this question, and predictably,
there is little agreement between the analysts. Sarata (2008 p 1) argues that genetic
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information has a number of characteristics which make it different from other types
of medical information:
it can be predictive of future disease; it is a unique identifier; it can reveal
information about family members; it is vertically transmitted (passed from
parent to child); it can impact communities; it can be used to discriminate and
stigmatize; and it can cause serious psychological harm. In addition, although
not specific to genetic information, the following characteristics also describe
genetic information: it can be obtained from small samples (possibly without
consent); it may be used for purposes other than those for which it was
collected; it is of interest to third parties (such as employers and insurers); it
may be important for determining susceptibility to disease and effectiveness of
treatment; and it can be recovered from stored specimens after many years.
She argues that it is the combination of these characteristics that make genetic
information different to other information, and more importantly, more special than
other types of information. Taken individually, some of these characteristics are
apparent in various other types of information relevant to each of us. For example, my
name, date and time of birth could amount to a ‘unique identifier’ of me. Knowledge
of an HIV + status, or infertility may cause me to suffer ‘serious psychological harm’.
Whilst it would be facetious to dismiss each of the characteristics in this way, it could
be done. Her argument is then, that the total specialness of genetic information is
greater than the sum of its individual characteristics. There is something extra about
genetic information which makes it more special than other information. Green and
Botkin (2003), who ultimately conclude that there is nothing special about genetic
information, take a similar approach to Sarata (2008). They consider four
characteristics of genetic information which are said to distinguish it from other
types of medical information. They discuss claims that genetic information is special
because it can predict the future, it provides information about family members as
well as the individual being tested, it has been used to discriminate against and to
stigmatise people and finally that serious psychological harm might be caused to
individuals and families through knowledge from genetic information. Each of these
claims for the specialness of genetic information is dismissed on the grounds that
they do not only apply to genetic information. If we are to find that genetic
information is special on the basis of these characteristics, then we must also find
that other information with the same characteristics is as special as genetic
information. Green and Botkin’s (2003) argument is that the total specialness is
equal to the sum of the individual characteristics, and since those do not indicate that
there is anything special about genetic information, the combination will not either.
If its characteristics are not sufficient to show that there is something special
about genetic information, then there must be some other explanation for genetic
exceptionalism. Green and Botkin (2003 p 572) highlight a possible argument:
‘Right or wrong, genetic information is believed to reveal who we “really” are’.
They do not tackle this argument, simply accepting that this view might be held.
However, this argument might unlock why there is such strong feeling about the
importance of genetic information, and why authors such as Sarata (2008) feel able
to argue that genetic information is special despite there being nothing in the
characteristics of genetic information to support that claim.
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Richards (2001 p 667) explores the argument in more depth. He begins with a
particularly eloquent quote from Bill Clinton who suggested that ‘genes are “the
language in which God created man”’. This he tackles from two angles, first the
biology, and then the social construction of DNA. The two angles begin from the same
point: our genes are us. If our genes are the essence of our humanity, then our genetic
information deserves special treatment because our humanity deserves respect.
Genetic information becomes something mystical and spiritual. This mystical nature
is drawn to the forefront, and used as a trump card to end discussions about the
importance of genetics. If our genetic information is the core of our existence then
there can be no doubt about the place of genetic information in society. It must be
paramount. Richards (2001 p 668) challenges this position by considering the
biology of genetics and argues that ‘DNA may be a large and complex molecule, but
alone it does nothing’. DNA is a small part of a much larger developmental process.
Genes are a necessary, but not sufficient condition for existence.
It becomes clearer when he considers the social construction of DNA, why this
biological reality seems to be overlooked. The main problem he identifies is that
scientists’ primary method of communication with the public is through metaphors.
These metaphors tend to be deterministic and essentialist, identifying genetic
information as the only developmental factor worth any salt (Richards 2001).
Furthermore, many of these analogies tend to be with computer science or
communication technology. If scientists refer to the human genome as a compact
disc, then it is no small wonder that the wider population understand their genetic
make-up to hold everything of the essence of them. This becomes a vicious circle.
These types of metaphors are understood and accepted by the general public, so the
scientific community continue to use them. Unfortunately, the compact disc analogy
is unidirectional. Information can only flow from the genes, and never back to the
genes (Richards 2001). This puts the genome on a pedestal, separating it from the
developmental system which it could not function without.
This goes a long way to explaining why genetic information is seen as more
important and more special than other information about us. The high esteem that
genetic information is held in is more akin to a religious fervour. Often not explicitly,
this attitude permeates discussions of the importance of genetic information. Those
who believe that it is special may find it difficult to explain why, and will remain
unconvinced by arguments refuting their views which are based on the characteristics
of the information. The true believer will never be convinced by the committed atheist.
If this is the, unacknowledged, reason why genetic information is seen as more
important than other information, then we have a problem. This attitude prevents a
proper discussion being had of whether genetic information is special in some way.
“Genetic” is used as a trump card, and discussion stops. Furthermore, if there are in
fact good reasons for acting with caution in relation to the use of genetic
information, then those good reasons are subsumed into the “genes are us”
justifications for treating genetic information differently. Until we remove the
religious overtones, there is no hope of coming to a sensible conclusion about
whether there is anything special—exceptional—about genetic information which
could justify differences in the legislative and political approaches to its protection.
Despite the difficulty of identifying why genetic information is special, some
states have given legislative or quasi-legislative protection to genetic information,
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prohibiting its use for particular purposes or in particular ways. By singling out
genetic information for special treatment, it can be argued that these approaches feed
into the view that genetic information is special. Unfortunately, this does not appear
to be a virtuous circle. It simply provides more reasons why we should treat genetic
information differently, enhancing the mystical views of genetic information and
adding more barriers to a discussion of whether there is anything special about
genetic information.
There is a further difficulty with genetic exceptionalism, which may be an
extension of the problems of mysticism. Singling out genetic information as the
important factor in development of particular medical conditions endorses the view
that genetic make-up is the sole cause of the condition. This view is known as
genetic determinism, defined by Kirby (2000 p 197) as ‘the belief that human
behaviour, personality, and physical appearance are determined exclusively by a
person’s genetic makeup. Genetic determinism is a reductionist ideology in that it
seeks to explain a complex whole (a human being) in terms of its component parts
(individual genes)’. The problem with genetic determinism, as I have argued
elsewhere (Wilkinson 2010) is that it does not reflect the biological reality that genes
are only a small part of the reason we are who we are. Genetic exceptionalism and
genetic determinism strengthen each other, and can be used to justify discrimination
on the basis of genetics. If genes are the most important factor in who we are, then it
is logical to conclude that the way we are is dictated by our genes. We can take this a
step back and say that if an embryo is found to have the gene for laziness for
example, then the child and adult it will become will be lazy. At the moment, if a
child is found to be lazy, then parents and teachers would encourage a change in
behaviour. In the genetically determined future, the child might be left to his or
her laziness, justified by the idea that s/he was designed that way. Whilst this
might be a frivolous example, it is not confined to this issue. It might be seen as
acceptable to deny employment on the basis of a genetic predisposition, or to deny
access to healthcare where there is a predisposition which might prevent treatment
being successful. For example, if there is a genetic predisposition towards
addiction, then it might be justifiable to deny addiction treatments to anyone with
that predisposition. If we subscribe to and endorse genetic determinism then we
have to agree that irrespective of our interventions, the genes will win. Whatever
we do to help the genetically-predisposed drug addict will be a waste of time and
resources since it cannot hope to succeed. If that is the case, then we are better off
conserving our scarce resources and denying addiction treatment. While this is no
doubt the antithesis of what we are more likely to think is appropriate—that we
should be treating people with addiction problems—denial of treatment to those
with a genetic predisposition is the logical future of a society that endorses genetic
determinism.
It seems clear that there are some serious difficulties with the concept of genetic
exceptionalism. It is arguable that legislative and quasi-legislative approaches which
endorse this concept are flawed and could be harmful to the societies they are part
of. The next section will explore the ways in which the UK and the US have
approached the problem of the use of genetic information for insurance purposes,
and consider whether the claim that these approaches endorse genetic exceptionalism
has any truth.
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Genetically exceptionalist legislation?
In the UK, there has been a moratorium on the use of genetic test information
for insurance purposes since 1998. It was introduced by the Association of
British Insurers (“ABI”) in response to concerns from the public and the media
about discrimination. Davey (2000 p 588) notes that this first agreement ‘did not
rule out the use of existing genetic test results in assessing whether and on what
terms to conclude contracts of insurance’, although there would be no requirement
for consumers to undergo predictive tests before applying for insurance. The
industry’s moratorium was initially intended to run for 3 years. When it came up
for review in 2001, the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee
strongly recommended that the government and the ABI should agree the
continuation of the moratorium for at least two more years (Science and
Technology Committee 2000-1 [71]). This strong recommendation was backed
up by a suggestion that if insurers were ‘unable, or unwilling, to regulate
themselves’ the government should ‘enforce its will by legislation’. The ABI’s
response was to negotiate with the government for a continuation of the
moratorium for 5 years (Daykin et al 2003 p 813). The 2001 moratorium was
reviewed in 2005, and in March of that year the government and the ABI
published their Concordat and Moratorium on Genetics and Insurance (Depart-
ment of Health 2005). It was informed by discussions between the government,
the ABI, the Genetics and Insurance Committee (“GAIC”), the Human Genetics
Commission (“HGC”), patient groups and other interested parties, and was
described as ‘a single high-level policy agreement’ that would establish ‘a robust
and flexible framework for cooperation between the government and the
Association of British Insurers’ (Department of Health 2005 p 1-2). The
moratorium was due to expire on 1 November 2011 but its application was
extended when the concordat was reviewed in 2008. The moratorium will now run
until 2014 (Association of British Insurers 2008).
The moratorium (Department of Health 2005) itself is formed of two provisions:
1. Customers will not be required to disclose the results of predictive genetic tests
for policies up to £500,000 of life insurance, or £300,000 for critical illness
insurance, or paying annual benefits of £30,000 for income protection insurance
(“the financial limits”). More than 97% of policies issued in 2004 were below
these limits in each category.
2. When the cumulative value of insurance exceeds the financial limits, insurers
may seek information about, and customers must disclose, tests approved by
GAIC2 for use for a particular insurance product, subject to the restrictions in the
Concordat.
To date, the only test approved by GAIC is for the predisposition towards
Huntington’s Chorea, and the ABI has no intention of applying for approval of any
other genetic tests (Genetics and Insurance Committee undated). At this point in time,
2 GAIC has recently been disbanded and the Human Genetics Commission has taken over its role.
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no one applying for life insurance, critical illness insurance or income protection
insurance will be required to disclose the results of a predictive genetic test, unless
they are applying for products which exceed the financial limits, in which case they
will have to disclose the results of a Huntington’s test, if they have had one. The
concordat also states that predictive genetic test information will not be relevant to,
and thus will not be used when pricing, travel insurance, private medical insurance,
any one-off or annual policy or for long-term care policies. Whilst there are numerous
arguments to be made about the effectiveness of the moratorium as an approach to
dealing with this problem (Wilkinson 2010) it is apparent that this amounts to an
almost blanket ban on the use of predictive genetic test results for insurance purposes.3
To a certain extent, it appears that the moratorium exceptionalises genetic
information. There is no comparable policy for other types of medical information.
The legal position is that insurance contracts are uberrimae fidei—with utmost good
faith—which means that there is a requirement for applicants to disclose all
information that is material to the decision to offer insurance and setting premiums.4
Since the test for materiality is whether the information would have affected the
insurer’s judgment when deciding whether to offer insurance or set a premium,5 it
will be necessary for an applicant to disclose most information. The moratorium
excludes predictive genetic test results from the ordinary legal position, setting that
type of information above other types of information which might still have a
number of characteristics in common with predictive genetic information. In
addition, the concordat specifically preserves insurers’ rights to take account of
family medical histories and medical reports when setting premiums and deciding
whether to offer insurance at all (Department of Health 2005). In the majority of
cases, an individual’s family medical history will give insurers more than enough
information to make an accurate prediction of an applicant’s risk. If an applicant has
a family history of a highly penetrant dominant single gene disorder such as
Huntington’s Chorea, then at the very least their premiums will be considerably
higher than an applicant without such a family history, and they may also be denied
3 It might be argued that the position in the UK has a lot to recommend it, since most people can access
insurance without having to disclose the results of a predictive genetic test. However, the potential for
injustice arises from the temporary nature of the moratorium. There is nothing stopping insurers deciding
to depart from the moratorium. At best, the Association of British Insurers has moral authority over its
members and cannot bind them to keep to the moratorium. Further, there is no guarantee that those who
have had a test while the moratorium has been in force would be protected if the moratorium were not to
be renewed. This “test now, buy later” problem is of such concern that there is anecdotal evidence that
some physicians are still advising patients to buy all the insurance cover they need before undergoing a
predictive genetic test (Human Genetics Commission undated). Thanks to Loane Skene for highlighting
this issue.
4 Bell v Lever Bros Ltd [1932] A C 161, 227; Banque Keyser SA v Skandia (UK) Ins Co Ltd [1990] 1 QB
665, 769. Carter v Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905, 1909–1910.
5 The test for materiality is to be found in section 18(2) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906: ‘Every
circumstance is material which would influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in fixing the premium or
determining whether he will take the risk.’ It was confirmed that this test applies to all classes of insurance
in Lambert v Cooperative Insurance Society [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 485 and Pan Atlantic Insurance
Company v Pine Top Insurance Company Limited [1995] 1 AC 501.
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insurance cover altogether.6 The discrepancy in approach is even more obvious in
this example: imagine that there is a predictive genetic test for heart disease. This
genetic test has a very high degree of accuracy, and thus it is tantamount to a
certainty. Two individuals apply for life insurance on the same day. The first
applicant, Anna, has a family history of heart disease, smokes and is overweight. She
has not had a genetic test for the predisposition to heart disease. The second
applicant, Bertha, has a clean family history, is a lifelong non-smoker, and is a
healthy weight. She has undergone the genetic test for heart disease and is positive
for the predisposition. Assume that the risks shown by Anna’s family history are
comparable to the risks shown by Bertha’s genetic test information. Both Anna and
Bertha have the same risk of suffering from heart disease. Under the current position
in the UK, Anna would be required to disclose her family medical history and her
smoking habit, and her life insurance premiums would be adjusted upwards to
compensate. Bertha would disclose her clean family medical history, her lack of
smoking habit, and her premiums would be lower than average. She would not be
required to disclose her predisposition. Although Anna and Bertha have identical
risk factors, Bertha would end up paying a significantly lower premium than Anna.
On the face of it, Anna and Bertha are identical, but Bertha is protected by a
genetically exceptionalist moratorium, where Anna has to take full responsibility for
her risk. Both women will suffer from the same condition and in the same way. The
only reason that they are treated differently by the law is Bertha’s good fortune to
have had the test for a genetic predisposition to heart disease and Anna’s bad luck
not to. There is no other reason for treating these two cases differently, and yet the
law does so because of the genetic factor. It considers the genetic make-up to be a
good reason for distinguishing the cases. This seems to be genetic exceptionalism at
its purest.
The approach taken in the US is different from that taken in the UK. There is
federal legislation which prohibits genetic discrimination in health insurance and
employment. The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 2008 (“GINA”) came
into force in May 2009 (Anonymous 2008; Murphy 2009) after a thirteen year battle
to get it onto the statute book. Hudson et al. (2008) note that the first federal
legislation to prohibit the misuse of genetic information was introduced in 1995. At
the time, they argue, researchers and scientists in the area thought that this law was
forward-looking. It was showing a strong commitment to the protection of its
citizens for the US to introduce legislation to protect them against genetic
discrimination when there were very few genetic tests available. Fourteen years
later, the Act has come into force, and the climate has changed significantly. To
illustrate, in 2001, a case was brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity
6 There is a real question about whether the use of family history information is appropriate in insurance
decisions, since it can result in an applicant and their family becoming uninsurable. This already happens
to families with a history of Huntington’s Chorea. This question must fall outside the scope of this article,
however, there is no doubt that it needs further exploration. In the UK at the moment, it is lawful for
insurers to use family history information to underwrite life insurance. The discussion of genetic test
information in this article is designed to highlight the discrepancies in allowing the use of family history
information and not allowing the use of predictive genetic test information. Arguments that insurers
should not be able to use family history information force the proponent to argue for a fundamental change
to the nature of insurance. This argument is worth having, but it cannot be given full consideration in this
paper. Thanks to Loane Skene for highlighting this issue.
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Commission (“EEOC”) against the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company
(“BNSF”) for disability discrimination. In that case,7 BNSF were challenged on the
basis that their compulsory medical examination contained a genetic test for a
predisposition to carpal tunnel syndrome. Carpal tunnel syndrome had affected a
number of BNSF employees and the argument was made that having this
information in advance would enable the company to resolve claims for
compensation in a more timely manner. Whilst, on the face of it, this justification
seems to be harmless, it has wider implications. If this test had shown that particular
employees had a predisposition towards carpal tunnel syndrome then it would have
been legitimate for the company to lower the compensation offered should those
employees suffer from the condition at any stage in their employment. If this policy
had been allowed to continue, then we have a similar situation to that of Anna and
Bertha. Imagine that Clyde and Denton both work for BNSF. After 20 years of
employment, they have both developed carpal tunnel syndrome. Clyde has no
predisposition, and the condition is found to have been caused by his employment
activities. In his medical examination, Denton was found to have the genetic marker
for carpal tunnel syndrome. His condition is found to have been caused jointly by his
predisposition and his employment activities. On a strict proportion calculation,
Denton would be entitled to half the compensation that Clyde was offered. The only
difference between their cases is that Denton has a genetic predisposition where
Clyde does not. Denton has the same loss of functionality as Clyde, and the same
pain levels, but is penalised for something over which he has no control. Fink (2003
p 528) argues that the only reason the EEOC challenged BNSF was because the
carpal tunnel test was a genetic test. The 33 other tests that were carried out were
found not to violate their duties under the Americans with Disabilities Act 2002. If
the other tests were able to provide sufficient information for BNSF to predict which
employees would suffer from carpal tunnel syndrome, then it is certainly arguable
that the only reason for challenging the genetic test was because there is something
special about genetic information. Genetic information is exceptionalised in an
attempt to protect employees.
This case indicated the direction in which the legislature would be going in
relation to the use of genetic information. In the US, unlike in the UK, there is no
National Health Service, and the majority of health insurance, and thus healthcare, is
provided through employers. Since employers will pay health insurance premiums
for their employees, it could be argued that if genetic information would have a
significant impact on the cost of those health insurance premiums, employers should
have access to that information. Counterbalancing this, is the serious concern that
employers might use this type of information to deny employment to those with genetic
predispositions to serious conditions. The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act
2008 sought to allay those concerns. GINA prohibits the use of genetic information for
restricting access to health insurance8 and employment discrimination on the basis of
genetic information.9 Health insurers are prohibited from adjusting insurance
7 The case was unreported, but Stephen Fink’s article (Fink 2003) is extremely enlightening.
8 Sections 101–106.
9 Sections 201–213.
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premiums on the basis of genetic information, and from requesting, requiring or
collecting genetic information for underwriting purposes. With regards to employ-
ment, employers may not decide whether or not to employ someone, or whether or
not to retain an employee’s services on the basis of information about their genetic
make-up. Nor may an employer deny employment opportunities on the basis of
genetic information.10
This legislation is intended to target an area of growing concern. Matloff et al’s
(2000) study of genetic counsellors showed that fear of insurance repercussions
could lead to patients choosing not to have tests that they otherwise would want, and
taking genetic tests under assumed names in order to keep the information away
from their health insurer. Notwithstanding that there may be very good reasons for
enacting legislation of this sort, there is no doubt that it also exceptionalises genetic
information. The position highlighted by the BNSF case supports this conclusion.
Even prior to the enactment of GINA, employers could be challenged for using genetic
tests but not for using other medical tests, even where those medical tests provided the
same amount of information as a genetic test. GINA continues this position. A health
insurer can be legally challenged if it changes premiums on the basis of genetic
information but not where changes to premiums are justified on other grounds.
This comparison of the UK and the US, albeit brief, leads us to an unfortunate
conclusion: all legislative or quasi-legislative approaches which prohibit discrimina-
tion on the grounds of genetic make-up could be subject to the genetic exceptionalism
criticism. Further, if genetic exceptionalism is as harmful as it is suggested, then it
would seem logical to argue that legislative or quasi-legislative approaches grounded
in genetic exceptionalism are as harmful, and should not be part of our portfolio of
solutions. This claim was made by Ron Zimmern at a recent seminar organised by the
Human Genetics Commission.11 Essentially, he argued that there was no relevant
difference between genetic information and other information. He argued that since
this was the case, we should not be trying to solve the problem of “genetic”
discrimination. The implication was that we should look at discrimination in a
general way rather than narrowing it down into specific categories. One might call
this a “legislating for fairness” claim. Whilst this position is intuitively attractive to
the non-lawyer, it is not as straightforward as it might seem.
Could we legislate for fairness?
Once we move into the realms of legislation and law-making, it is imperative that the
provisions written are usable in day-to-day life. Diver (1983) argues that, in order to
be administratively workable, rules must be transparent, accessible and congruent. A
10 The first cases are already being brought under GINA. In one case, Pamela Fink alleges that the
company she worked for, MXenergy, terminated her employment because she tested positive for the
BRCA gene, and had some time off work for a mastectomy. The company deny the allegations (Lowe
2010).
11 Papers from Understanding Genetic Discrimination are available at www.hgc.gov.uk. Zimmern’s paper
is not available with the rest of the presentations from the seminar. I take full responsibility for any errors
in paraphrasing.
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rule is transparent if ‘words with well-defined and universally accepted meanings are
chosen’ (Diver 1983 p 67). A rule is accessible to the target audience if it is
‘applicable to concrete situations without excessive difficulty or effort’ (Diver 1983
p 67). A rule is congruent if ‘the substantive content of the message’ as communicated
by the draftsman ‘produces the desired behaviour’ (Diver 1983 p 67). In essence, a
rule must be very tightly drafted so as to ensure ease of application, ease of
interpretation, and therefore some success in achieving the desired purposes.
We have seen that in order to be transparent, rules must use words with well-
defined and universally accepted meanings. The concept of fairness will certainly
cause a problem. The Chambers 21st Century Dictionary (undated) defines fairness
as '1 just; not using dishonest methods or discrimination. 2 in accordance with the
rules'. Although this definition seems to accord with what we mean by fairness, it
does not help us at all in defining a concept of fairness for legislative purposes. Since
legislation is intended to create the rules, it is of no help to us to say that fairness is
‘in accordance with the rules’. This cannot help us to decide if the rules are fair. The
first definition might help with that: the rules are fair if they are just. But, what do
we mean by just? If we are interested in justice, then we might turn to historical
ideas of justice based in vengeance. If it is important to us for people to pay for their
actions and decisions, then we might choose to fine people in some way for
behaviour that is considered inappropriate. If we were trying to create a life
insurance system on this basis, then we might fine people for the decision to smoke,
or for not exercising. It would require a clear definition of what we consider to be
inappropriate behaviour and a scale of fines. This approach values the correct
choices, and it is the choice that is crucial. Those who appear not to have made a
choice would be exempt from the fine. Whilst this would protect sufferers of genetic
conditions, since they would not have chosen to have the predisposition, it could be
used to punish their parents. The notion of inappropriate behaviour might include
embarking on intimate relationships where there is a high risk of passing on a genetic
condition. People could be required to have genetic tests prior to marriage and
prevented from marrying where there is a significant risk. Since it is also possible to
have children outside of wedlock, this could be taken a step further, and procreation
could be regulated in a way to prevent genetically inappropriate coupling. Although
one might argue that this is extremely far-fetched, it began with a widely recognised
historical concept of justice. It illustrates the importance of defining the starting point
in a way which prevents it being used in a way which we do not intend.
If we are thinking about fairness in insurance then we might use actuarial fairness
as the starting point. This approach requires each individual to be responsible for the
risk that he brings to the insurance pool. Specifically, it is unfair to require other
individuals to subsidise risks unrelated to them (Moultrie and Thomas 1997; Leigh
1998; Wood and Williams 1964; Joly et al 2003; Nowlan 2002). Therefore, on this
view, insurers are entitled to set individual insurance premiums on whatever basis
they choose. All information must be disclosed, and insurers may use it in whatever
way they see fit. This would amount to an absolute freedom to underwrite, as
envisaged by Leigh (1998) who argues that insurers must be able to use any
information to distinguish between people whether it is relevant or irrelevant to the
decision offered. His extreme conception would include the right to distinguish
people on the grounds of race, an activity which the UK's Race Relations Act
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expressly prohibits. Whilst legislation based on this concept of fairness would satisfy
insurers12 it seems not to fulfil our ideas about the most just way to administer
society. Further, it argues not that we should be trying to remove discrimination
between people, but that we should embrace it and increase the divisions between
individuals and groups in society. Rather than trying to remove or mitigate the
disadvantages caused by genetic make-up, the solution is to disadvantage others on
different grounds. Whilst this would seem to be one of the least satisfactory
conceptions of fairness on which to base our legislation, it is ironic to note that it
would be relatively easy to draft legal provisions to put it into effect.
A second conception of fairness which might be useful to us, is that proposed by
John Rawls. He argues that there are two principles underpinning a just society: all
individual members of society should be equal, and that the only occasion when they
may be treated unequally is to improve the position of the worst off (Rawls 1999).
He uses an extended metaphor, the original position, to explain how these principles
would be arrived at. He argues that a group of rational and mutually disinterested
persons (Rawls 1999 p 125) who are behind a veil of ignorance (Rawls 1999 p 118),
in that they are not aware of the characteristics that they have, whether they are rich
or poor, healthy or ill, male or female, would choose these two principles as the basis
for a just society. The argument is that since the persons in this original position
would not know whether they were to be the worst off members of the society they
were designing, they would ensure that those who were worst off were appropriately
protected. This concept of fairness runs exactly counter to the conception of actuarial
fairness invoked by the insurance industry. It requires society to protect those who
are disadvantaged by their position, and give them the opportunities that they might
otherwise be denied. This is a much more satisfactory concept of fairness, which
would seem to protect those disadvantaged by their genetic make-up, but without
disadvantaging others.
Whilst this might amount to a satisfactory definition of fairness, it is far from a
universally accepted meaning of fairness. In order to use this in legislative
provisions, additional definitions must be included to ensure that adjudicators know
what concept of fairness they were required to apply. In order to be transparent then,
the legislating for fairness claim could be written in this way:
1) Individuals should act fairly in their dealings with one another.
2) Acting fairly requires individuals to treat each other equally except where equal
treatment results in unequal outcomes.
3) If treating people equally results in a disadvantage to one party, then individuals are
required to treat others differently in order to improve the position of the worst off.
Whilst we may have solved the transparency challenge, it would seem that the
legislating for fairness claim would fail the accessibility requirement that it can be
applied to a concrete set of circumstances without excessive difficulty or effort.
Consider a concrete set of circumstances such as this: Edward has been refused life
insurance coverage. The reason given by the insurer is his genetic predisposition
12 It is worth noting that Spencer Leigh is somewhat of an extremist, and it is far from clear that all
insurers would argue for a completely unfettered freedom to underwrite. However, it also seems unlikely
that they would argue against it if it were handed to them on a plate.
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towards condition X, a condition characterised by loss of mental function and motor
function after the age of 70. If the legislating for fairness claim is a requirement to
act fairly towards each other, then it should be apparent that it will be extremely
difficult to apply it to this set of concrete circumstances. Edward would argue that it
is unfair to deny him life insurance in this case. The insurer would argue that it is
unfair to require them to cover Edward's life. Both might argue that they are the
worst off in this situation. Unless there is a schedule of additional considerations for
an adjudicator to use, it would be extremely difficult to decide which party's interests
should prevail. Furthermore, if this was adjudicated by a court in a common law
country, that court would be forced to make a decision and to give reasons for that
decision. A court would do the best they could, but would inevitably end up filling
in the gaps for themselves. This leads to judge-made law, which can be difficult to
apply in any general way, and is therefore likely to be inconsistently applied. This is
problematic for the potential claimants, who have no way of predicting how the law
will be applied to their situation.
To ensure accessibility, rules should anticipate the circumstances to which they
will apply. Edward's circumstances involve denial of insurance and genetic make-up.
When deciding how the law should apply to his situation, Edward should be able to
look at laws relating to denial of insurance or rules relating to genetic make-up. Ideally,
those rules would be sufficiently clearly written that he would be able to reach a
conclusion about how they would apply to his own situation. However, there is a
further balance to be made here. Whilst it is undesirable to have a rule which requires
fairness between parties, it is perhaps equally undesirable to have rules that are too
specific. This could lead to a glut of rules that will be used only rarely. It is
unnecessary, for example, to have a rule which deals with denial of insurance on the
basis of a predisposition towards condition X. If we think that it is unacceptable to
deny insurance on the basis of a predisposition towards condition X, then we may also
think that it is unacceptable to deny insurance on the basis of a predisposition towards
condition Y, and condition Z. Rather than write a series of different rules prohibiting
the denial of insurance coverage on a number of different bases, it would be better to
aim for a middle ground. A middle ground might look something like this:
1) It is prohibited to deny insurance coverage if the reason for doing so falls within
section 2.
2) Prohibited reasons include: genetic predispositions, family history information,
and current medical conditions...
This provision indicates how legislative rules should be constructed in order to be
both accessible and transparent. It is the third requirement which will indicate how
section 2 should be drafted.
A law will be congruent if it delivers the desired results. The question is then,
what are the results that we desire? If what we are concerned about is the appropriate
uses of genetic information, then that should be the basis of the legislative provision
that is written. For example:
1) Genetic information can be used for the purposes set out in section 2.
2) Appropriate purposes include: insurance underwriting, providing medical care,
employment decisions...
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Alternatively, we could be concerned about discrimination in the insurance
market. Legislative provisions addressing that issue could start from the premise that
discrimination in the insurance context is prohibited. We would then need to be very
clear about the types of discrimination that we consider to be inappropriate. When
constructing legislative provisions, the primary focus must be on the policy that
underpins that legislation. If the policy is sound—if we know what it is that we want
our legislation to do—then drafting it will be relatively straightforward. If the policy
is not clear, no amount of skilful drafting will make the legislation work.
Conclusion
The message to be drawn from this article is this: grounding arguments about the
appropriate uses of genetic information in the claim of genetic exceptionalism is likely
to generate more heat than light. Even if there is any truth to the claim that genetic
information is special in some way, such truth is likely to get lost among the hyperbole
of genes as the essence of humanity. Not only is the claim of genetic exceptionalism
unlikely to carry much weight in legal challenges to legislation, the concept itself
offers little guidance on the appropriate uses of genetic information, and where the
boundary ought to be drawn between appropriate and inappropriate uses.
On the other hand, attempts to sidestep this question at the policy level by advocating
legislation in terms of vague standards such as fairness are also likely to fail, due to their
inadequate legislative precision. Suggestions to this effect demonstrate a fundamental
lack of understanding both of the legislative process, and of the way in which judges
discern legislative intent. In conclusion, it seems that there is no way of avoiding direct
engagement with the often difficult policy questions concerning the appropriate uses of
genetic information. In order to enact useful and effective legislation, wemust tackle the
policy questions head on. Anything less will always result in weak and ineffective
legislation, legislation it would be better not to have had in the first place.
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